This time BAA Training team presents video about dual hydraulic failure in Airbus A320. Let’s find out how it went for Martynas and Yufei! To make it more interesting, we challenge you once again! Name all the mistakes that our team made, and the one with the closest answer will get our prize! You have two weeks for that! Do not forget – this video is not for training purposes!

BAA Training headquarters is in Lithuania and counts more than 20 years of experience in aviation training, while its heritage reaches 1938 – the establishment of the Lithuanian airlines training department. In addition to training base in headquters it is able to offer training solutions in various Europe, CIS and Asia locations.

Follow us
Facebook:
Twitter:

37 COMMENTS

  1. It's just playtime obviously. There is no instructor and it's not a training slot. The guy in the right seat is not even in training on the A320. Lighten up with the OCD Jesus! They are just playing.

  2. 1:15 Is it fart? Or maybe its a fly? Or maybe wasp? Bee?
    Farts are flammable, flies are f**** annoying and wasps may sting a neck and kill both pilots this way (they can sting multiple times unlike bees).

  3. btw these are not all the mistakes
    the main mistake of the crew was that always during a flight 1 pilot should control the flight and the communication while the other should perform the ECAM checklist and in this case these rules were not followed
    2)the LOC and G/S cannot be captured if the autopilot is not operational
    3)no chronometer was set during the takeoff roll
    4)pressed autobreak button when its INOP

  4. The ECAM procedure was not followed as per Airbus SOP. The ECAM was not stopped to check for normal checklist, any computer reset, QRH procedure. The status was not read. The Flap setting was not as per SOP, the speed needs to be checked first the the flap is to be set and setting to be called after seeing the SD page. The normal checklist were not done. Both the pilots were looking inside. PF was also entering data in MCDU. PM should have been doing all the MCDU entries, ECAM actions.

  5. 1- no seatbelts used
    2- no chrono for take off with TOGA
    3- when gear up, nose gear lights must be turned to OFF
    4- no oredered Ecam Actions
    5- At status: check C/B, check OEB, After T/O climb checklist
    6- Land asap red : it's a MAY DAY
    7- lack of preparation of the approach (no MCDU neither QRH in flight performance part)
    8- no approach briefing (asking for MED Auto/BRK after reading it as inop)
    9- no approach chart to check the descent and the final approach profile
    10- no minimums (MDA) insertion
    11- since Auto/Thrust is Auto, you must manage speed on the final segment of the approach to allow the Ground speed mini function to work in case of needed

    *by the way, good touchdown!
    you'll improve with time 😉

  6. Does the Airbus autopilot automatically disconnect when the stick is moved or does the pilot have to push the red button to manually disconnect the AP?

  7. 1. No chrono started on take off
    2. No half stick down on take off, until 80 knots and then progressively reduce the deflection to reach neutral at 100 knots; to counteract for the nose-up effect of setting engine take off thrust thus improving aircraft performance
    3. No "Engines stable" callout on take off. If there was a difference of more than 1% of N1 between the engines, it should be entered in the logbook after flight
    4. Squawking 7700 on take off, when the hydraulic failure hasn't occurred yet
    5. 2:43 UTC time on SD not synchronized with the cockpit clock thus showing amber XX
    6. Violating Airbus third operational golden rule: One head up at all times
    7. Clear SD (System display, Lower ECAM), throught the whole flight On 3:07, we can see an overflow sybmol which indicates there are more messages to be read, but because no one cleared it that messages weren't displayed to the flight crew until very the last end
    8. No minimums entered
    9. 7:00 Landing gear gravity extension wasn't done correctly. You should first pull and turn the handcrank 3 times clockwise and then select the gear down
    10. On touchdown nobody said "Spoilers up". Spoilers number 3 on each wing were fully operational, and armed upon landing.
    11. You didn't follow the APPR PROC on SD, if hydraulic system is lost by RSVR LO AIR PR the related pump (on approach) should be selected on and PTU to AUTO position. In most cases the hydraulic is RECOVERABLE.
    12. You have first extended the gear and then stabilized on VAPP, which is unfortunately wrong. FCOM 3.02.29 P11, Extending the gear after you have stabilized at VAPP enables the aircraft to be trimmed for the approach
    13. Landing distance procedure was never applied. It calls to multiply your LDG DIST for 2.3 times due to the increased approach speed, loss of antiskid and reversers 1+2 and partial loss of ground spoilers.
    14. 1:50 PF never reads ECAM procedures. PNF is responsible for ECAM/checklist reading and executing various commands on PF request.
    15. No consulting with QRH or any kind of manual. Many of these mistakes could then be avoided.
    16. No cabin crew notifying
    17. No ATC
    18. No Brace for impact for passengers. It's neccesery to do that because there is grave danger of overshotting or skidding the runway.
    19. No passengers were informed about the emergency on board
    20. No takeoff/approach/landing checklist
    21. Violating Airbus second operational golden rule: Fly, navigate, communicate – in that order
    22. 7:10 Clear E/WD(direct law warning), consequence: no LDG MEMO.
    23. ECAM Actions were never said, you just started to read from ECAM, and what's worse PF started to read ECAM not PNF.
    24. You should say "speedcheck" BEFORE selecting flaps

  8. Wait so at 1:30 when the HYD warnings come on, and the first one says a problem with the yellow system, then at 1:46 the green one is fluctuating but the yellow one is constant 3000. Does that mean there is a problem with green or yellow? i am more of a 737 person 😛

  9. These are mistakes that your team made, in my opinion:
    1. No chrono started on take off. It is usually set to time the duration of power application, because the TOGA thrust has a strict limit of 5 minutes using it on 2 engine operation, while with single engine operation that limit increases to 10 minutes.
    2. No half stick down on take off, until 80 knots and then progressively reduce the deflection to reach neutral at 100 knots; to counteract for the nose-up effect of setting engine take off thrust thus improving aircraft performance.
    3. No "Thrust/Power set" callout on take off. If there was a discrepancy of more than 1% of N1 between the engines, it should be entered in the logbook after flight.
    4. Squawking 7700 on take off, while the failure haven't occur yet.
    5. 2:43 UTC time on SD not synchronized with the cockpit clock thus showing amber XX.
    6. Violeting Airbus third operational golden rule: "One head up at all times"!!
    7. Clear SD (System display, Lower ECAM), throught the whole flight no one cleared it. On 3:07 we can see an overflow sybmol which indicates there are more messages to be read, but because no one cleared it that messages weren't displayed to the flight crew until very the last end.
    8. No minimums entered.
    9. 7:00 Landing gear gravity extension wasn't done correctly. You should first pull and turn the handcrank 3 times clockvise and then select the gear down, but not vice versa! There is a big difference and I am surprised that nobody noticed it.
    10. On touchdown no "Spoilers up" call. Spoilers number 3 on each wing were fully operational, and armed upon landing.
    11. Now here gets interesting: Why haven't you followed the APPR PROC on SD? If hydraulic system is lost by RSVR LO AIR PR the related pump(on approach) should be selected on and PTU to AUTO position. In most cases the hydraulic is RECOVERABLE. Just think how many INOP systems you would recover! That's like, when engine fails(no damage or fire), you say: "No I don't won't to restart it". Ughhh..
    12. I noticed that you have first extended the gear and then stabilized on VAPP, which is unfortunately wrong. FCOM 3.02.29 P11, Extending the gear after you have stabilized at VAPP enables the aircraft to be trimmed for the approach, unfortunately, this wasn't done correctly.
    13. Landing distance procedure was never applied. It calls to multiply your LDG DIST for 2.3 times due to the increased approach speed, loss of antiskid and reversers 1+2 and partial loss of ground spoilers.
    14. 1:50 PF never reads ECAM procedures! PNF is responsible for ECAM/checklist reading and executing various commands on PF request. This isn't the only time PF does that.
    15. No consulting with QRH or any kind of manual! Many of this mistakes could then be avoided.
    16. No cabin crew or ATC notifying about the failure(these are actually 2 mistakes..)
    17. No "Brace for impact order" for passengers, in this kind of emergency it's neccesery to do that(grave danger of overshotting or skidding of the runway-since you don't have nosewheel steering).
    18. No passengers informing about the emergency on board.
    19. No takeoff/approach/landing checklist.
    20. Violeting Airbus second operational golden rule: "Fly, navigate, communicate – in that order"!!
    21. 7:10 Clear E/WD(direct law warning), consequence: no LDG MEMO.
    22. And in my opinion one of the biggest mistakes is that you have never consider to put the aircraft in a hold. It would give you more time to set the things up for landing, and also to be more prepared and know what to expect. The approach briefing was never done(it is a crucial to do it when in an emergency), crew never discussed what will happen and how will the A/C behave on touchdown, what in a case of go-around which ultimately resulted that the crew wasn't aware of the failing systems: 5:01 . Autobrake was clearly INOP.
    23. ECAM Actions were never said, you just started to read from ECAM, and what's worse PF started to read ECAM not PNF.

    I just have a one question for you: What have you done with ENG1 before takeoff since it has almost 15 times more fuel used than the right engine?! 1:10 (ENG 1 3600kg, ENG 2- 250kg)Have you kept him on MCT for 1h and then started the right one?

    I bet that someone will copy mine!

  10. – No Seatbelts
    – No headsets
    – No communication with ATC
    – No takeoff checklist
    – Rotated too soon ( before PNF announced rotate)
    – No V2 announced
    – PNF did not announce engines stable
    – PF did not say flaps 1
    – No after takeoff checklist
    – Should have turned on autopilot before beginning systems check
    – Did not tell ATC having problems
    – Should have announced a mayday when autopilot stopped working
    – PNF should have been conducting all systems checks, not the PF
    – No communication with passengers alerting them of the situation and reasons why
    – No communication with ATC explaining situation, announcing mayday or requesting emergency landing and/ or emergency services.
    – Did not clear problems list, so if new problems appear, may go unnoticed
    – No approach checklist
    – No landing checklist

  11. No atc
    No seatbelt signs
    Not leaving the runway quickly
    Not following checklists
    Not saying who is in controll
    No use of apu/atr
    Not informing passengers

  12. Okay lets start :
    – No seat belts
    – No stabilized thrust callout?
    – Inappropriate comment from F/O
    – No RWY HDG in Autopilot
    – No "ECAM-Actions"
    – No QRH/Checklist usage
    – No communication with ATC/Passengers
    – F/O and Pilot not aware of all failing systems (autobreak / flaps)
    – No briefing for landing
    – In Parts : No Affirmmation/Confirmation for given Commands to F/O (i.e. Parking Brake)

    In addition : Both were focussed on the problem and they forgot that they need to fly the airplane itself

    But hey, they landed the plane successfully

  13. Why do ppl think the APU is of any use in a dual hydraulic loss scenario? The APU provides no hydraulic input only pneumatic and electrical input.

  14. how can you provide training when your videos lack some principle elements in Emergency procedures? is it like bunch of kids sitting in a Sim pretending to know stuff

  15. Biggest thing I noticed is no one is saying who's in control. Whoever flys needs to say "I have control" and also turn on the APU.. That thing can provide a lot of the power that is missig

  16. APU not turned on
    Not informing ATC
    No checklists from either pilot
    Really bad crew resource management – both are focussed on the problem and nobody is flying!!
    No informing passengers
    No fuel dumping (probably due to time) resulting in being well over maximum landing weight
    Emergency lights not turned on
    Not checking for traffic when making unannounced turns
    Possible runway incursion if its a busy airport
    Not leaving the runway as fast as possible

  17. The approch checklist was not followed as per the Status page. The hydraulics could have been recovered if the ECAM actions were carried out.

  18. The captain shouldn't be the one giving instructions almost as if it's an instructional flight…. PF flies and PNF does checklists with confidence and knowledge.
    Furthermore isn't it "flaps 1" command, then "speed check, flaps 1" response by PNF?

  19. APU not turned on
    Not informing ATC
    No checklists from either pilot
    Really bad crew resource management – both are focussed on the problem and nobody is flying!!
    No informing passengers
    No fuel dumping (probably due to time) resulting in being well over maximum landing weight
    Emergency lights not turned on
    Not checking for traffic when making unannounced turns
    Possible runway incursion if its a busy airport
    Not leaving the runway as fast as possible

  20. -rotate to soon (just after V1)
    -no refering to QRH
    -both pilots focust on the problem (1 should fly the plane the other one should try to solve the problem)
    -no approach brief or communication for futher plans after the start of the problems
    -he calls for autobrake medium but is inop
    – no informing of the cabin crew at one moment or so
    -no informing atc of some kind
    -no landing checklist
    -PM doesnt engage the spoilers after landing

  21. No use of any check list :(. No ECAM procedure applied. Poor CRM PF flies the plain while PNF makes the check list ECAM ATC etc. No check back by the other crew member. But nice video.

Leave a Reply